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CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION AS DISCRETIONARY 
INJUSTICE 
 
Peter R. Reilly* 
 
Abstract 
A recent federal appellate court ruling of first impression permits the 
resolution of allegations of serious corporate criminal wrongdoing by way 
of an Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism called Deferred 
Prosecution, without appropriate judicial review. This Article describes 
why this ruling is ill-advised, and suggests how other courts might address 
these same legal issues while arriving at different conclusions. This Article 
argues that if federal prosecutors are going to continue using Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”) in addressing allegations of corporate 
criminal misconduct, then that discretionary power must be confined and 
checked through meaningful judicial review. The overriding concern with 
the appellate court ruling is that if the law surrounding corporate DPAs 
is permitted to develop on its current course, federal prosecutors will 
continue to use these agreements in a discretionary manner that both 
subordinates public interest and undermines separation of power 
principles. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 5, 2015, U.S. District Judge Richard J. Leon did something no 
federal judge has ever done before: he outright rejected a Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement (“DPA”) the federal government had successfully negotiated with a 
corporate defendant. In United States v. Fokker Services, B.V. (“Fokker I”),1 Judge 
Leon declined to approve a DPA—a negotiated contract between the federal 
government and defendant Fokker Services which, conditioned upon the defendant’s 
satisfactory fulfillment of various agreed-upon provisions, would normally result in 
the charges being dismissed and the case being closed. In rejecting the DPA, Judge 
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Leon said the agreement was “grossly disproportionate to the gravity” of the 
offending behavior,2 concluding: “it would undermine the public’s confidence in the 
administration of justice and promote disrespect for the law for it to see a defendant 
prosecuted so anemically for engaging in such egregious conduct for such a 
sustained period of time . . . .”3 
The case was appealed. Fourteen months later in United States v. Fokker 
Services B.V. (Fokker II), a case of first impression, the appellate court vacated 
Judge Leon’s ruling and said the district court had “significantly overstepped its 
authority” in rejecting the DPA.4 Four attorneys in a leading U.S. law firm describe 
the appellate court’s holding of the Fokker II ruling as follows: 
 
Relying upon the Separation of Powers doctrine, a three-judge panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously held, in no 
uncertain terms, that district court judges are not empowered to reject 
deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) because they disagree with the 
prosecutors’ charging decisions or elements of the agreement.5 
 
In other words, under the Fokker II regime, if a federal prosecutor offers a DPA 
to a corporate defendant—even a highly sophisticated party alleged to have engaged 
in serious criminal misconduct—and the defendant agrees to abide by the terms of 
that deal, a district court can almost never reject the agreement based on its 
substantive terms. In effect, the prosecutor has employed the use of an Alternative 
Dispute Resolution mechanism—a DPA—to resolve the matter without meaningful 
judicial review.  
This outcome raises the following question: to what extent, if any, is a federal 
district court empowered to reject a DPA? In other words, to what extent are the 
agreement provisions that form DPAs subject to judicial review, if at all, given the 
statutory directives and constitutional constraints pertaining to the agreements? 
This Article argues the ruling in Fokker II provides prosecutors too much 
unfettered discretion in their use of DPAs. As Professor Kenneth Davis warns in his 
seminal work, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry:6 Although 
“[e]liminating discretionary power would . . . stifle individualized justice,”7 such 
power “should be properly confined, structured, and checked.”8 In describing 
various weaknesses within the ruling in Fokker II, this Article thereby suggests to 
readers that courts facing similar cases should rule in a different manner.  
																																								 																				
2 Id. at 167. 
3 Id. 
4 United States v. Fokker Services B.V. (Fokker II), 818 F.3d 733, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
5 Mark A. Rush et al., BNA Insights: Imbalance of Power: Federal Prosecutors’ Nearly 
Unilateral Discretion to Resolve Allegations of Corporate Misconduct After D.C. Circuit 
Panel Overrules District Court’s Rejection of Deferred Prosecution Agreement in U.S. v. 
Fokker, 48 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1005, 1005 (2016). 
6 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). 
7 Id. at 217. 
8 Id. at 216. 
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In building this case, Part II gives a brief history of DPAs and discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of using them in corporate matters. Part III describes, 
based upon legislative history, how employing DPAs to resolve allegations of 
corporate criminal misconduct goes far afield from the Congressionally-intended 
purpose of using the agreements to promote the social rehabilitation of a narrow 
category of disadvantaged individuals whose social and economic profiles contrast 
starkly with those of corporate entities and the white collar professionals who run 
them. Parts IV and V analyze the federal rulings (three district court opinions and 
one appellate court opinion) that directly address judicial review of corporate DPAs 
during the approval process. Finally, Part VI presents the conclusion by offering a 
summary of arguments regarding why both Congress and other courts should now 
work to redirect the flawed legal course on which DPAs have been set via the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Fokker II.  
 
II.  CORPORATE DPAS IN CONTEXT 
 
DPAs “have become a mainstay of white collar criminal law enforcement.”9 
Indeed, Professor Julie O’Sullivan calls their increased use part of the “biggest 
change in corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years.”10 Since the 
government began using them in the corporate context in the early 1990s, hundreds 
have been employed to settle allegations of misconduct—and with some of the 
country’s most well-known corporate entities, including America Online, Boeing, 
General Electric, JPMorgan, Johnson & Johnson, and Sears.11 The agreements have 
been used to address many different kinds of matters—including various fraud and 
trade offenses, as well as allegations of wrongdoing under the False Claims Act, the 
Controlled Substances Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the Food, Drug 
& Cosmetic Act.12  
																																								 																				
9 Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address at the New York 
City Bar Ass’n (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-
general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-city-bar-association [https://perma.cc/4APU-
DE3Q]. 
10 Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of 
Corporations” Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What that Means 
for the Purposes of the Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 77 (2014). 
11 BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 47–48 (2014). 
12 2013 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON DUNN (July 9, 2013), http://www.gibson 
dunn.com/publications/Pages/2013-Mid-Year-Update-Corporate-Deferred-Prosecution-
Agreements-and-Non-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx [https://perma.cc/AJK5-CWV3]. 
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A good deal of scholarship has been published regarding both the positive13 
and negative14 aspects of DPAs. On one hand, some suggest that DPAs can 
successfully: (1) enable the parties to resolve the matter quickly and efficiently, 
without the time and expense involved in a traditional prosecution and trial;15 (2) 
mandate corporate compliance and internal reform measures—including “broad and 
far-reaching corporate governance changes” to business structures, boards, and 
senior management;16 (3) impose monetary penalties and restitution;17 (4) require 
companies to fund their own internal investigations and, in some cases, to hire an 
independent monitor to ensure effective implementation of the DPA agreement;18 
(5) help companies avoid collateral consequences that can sometimes flow from 
federal indictments (such as exclusion from government contracting), as well as 
avoid consequences to innocent third parties (such as employees or shareholders);19 
(6) require companies to acknowledge wrongdoing;20 and (7) require companies to 
agree to cooperate with government investigations.21  
On the other hand, using DPAs remains controversial because some suggest 
that: (1) their use results in the prosecution of fewer individuals (as opposed to 
																																								 																				
13 See, e.g., Connor Bildfell, Justice Deferred? Why and How Canada Should Embrace 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Corporate Criminal Cases, 20 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 
163–65 (2016). 
14 See, e.g., Peter R. Reilly, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our 
Failed Experiment in Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 2015 BYU L. REV. 307, 
309 (2015). 
15 Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution 
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1458 (2007) (“[G]overnment prosecutors often have 
to tangle with well-financed defendants capable of hiring sophisticated law firms that can 
match government resources.”). 
16 Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013, 70 THE BUS. LAW. 61, 
112 (2014). 
17 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS 
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 11 (Dec. 2009) 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6KV-UDAM]. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 37 (discussing the “negative consequences [resulting from criminal charges and 
convictions] for innocent third parties . . . including employees, pensioners, shareholders, 
creditors, customers, and the general public”). 
20 Mary Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, 57 SEC. REG. 
INST. 817, 824 (2005) (explaining that DPAs can include “some sort of acknowledgement of 
responsibility or stipulations of facts as the government sees them,” as well as “an agreement 
not to publicly dispute the acknowledgment or stipulation, including in civil litigation”). 
21 David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the 
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2013) (“The terms of 
the agreements are attractive to the government, because they often provide large penalties, 
far-reaching corporate compliance programs with outside monitors approved by the 
Department, and promises of cooperation by the companies involved.”). 
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entities) for corporate wrongdoing;22 (2) the government has more bargaining power 
than target companies, leading to possible abuse and exploitation in negotiating and 
implementing the agreements;23 (3) the government lacks the training and expertise 
to create the most appropriate DPA penalty and reform provisions;24 (4) the use of 
DPAs has caused the government to focus too much on reforming and regulating 
corporate governance rather than prosecuting corporate criminal wrongdoing;25 (5) 
using DPAs to address possible corporate criminal misconduct fails to conform to 
the rule of law;26 (6) there are questions regarding whether DPAs effectively achieve 
the results and reforms envisioned by their proponents;27 and (7) the DPA agreement 
process lacks transparency and fails to adequately involve the public and other 
interested parties.28  
Whatever advantages and disadvantages there are to using DPAs in the 
corporate context, there are no signs suggesting the agreements might be 
legislatively or judicially ruled out of bounds in the near future.  
  
																																								 																				
22 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014) (“[T]he failure to prosecute those responsible 
[for the Great Recession] must be judged one of the more egregious failures of the criminal 
justice system in many years.”). 
23 Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution 
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1434 (2007) (arguing that DPAs “provide prosecutors 
with a dangerous amount of leverage over the corporations they target, creating a bargaining 
imbalance and a new threat of abuse”). 
24 See, e.g., Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: 
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 112 
(2007) (“[P]rosecutors, who now—often with little or no experience in corporate governance 
matters—are solely charged with evaluating whether a company’s compliance program is 
adequate.”). 
25 Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 161 (2008).  
26 Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed 
Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 227 (2016). 
27 Reilly, supra note 14, at 345 (discussing assessments by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
suggesting that “the DOJ is neither in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of DPAs nor to 
measure how much such agreements lead to real and lasting corporate reform”). 
28 Bildfell, supra note 13, at 180 (“[T]he DPA process does not include any outside 
parties; it is a negotiation behind closed doors, to which only the prosecutor and company 
are invited. This leaves employees, community representatives, shareholders, and others out 
in the cold.”). 
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III.  SHOULD DPAS BE USED FOR CORPORATE MATTERS? 
 
Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act29 to ensure a judicial system “in which 
cases are disposed of with reasonable dispatch, whether or not prosecutors or 
defendants perceive speed as being in their interest.”30 To achieve this goal, 
Congress imposed time limits associated with prosecuting a case. For example, the 
Act states that a defendant’s trial must begin within seventy days after the 
government files an information or indictment.31 The Act also allows for certain 
exclusions from that seventy day limit, such as “[a]ny period of delay during which 
prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written 
agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of 
allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”32 It is that particular 
exemption—18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)—which enables the government to resolve 
cases using DPAs. 
Although the government has been using DPAs to resolve allegations of 
corporate misconduct since 1994,33 it is important to note that the Section 3161(h)(2) 
exclusion provision was designed, according to the Senate Committee Report, with 
the idea of “pretrial diversion or intervention programs in which prosecution of a 
certain category of defendants is held in abeyance on the condition that the 
defendant participate in a social rehabilitation program.”34 The Committee Report 
goes on to state that “[i]f the defendant succeeds in the program, charges are 
dropped.”35  
The Report notes that such diversion programs “have been quite successful 
with first offenders”36 and points specifically to the Manhattan Court Employment 
Project in New York City (which targeted mostly unemployed people, ages sixteen 
to forty-five, and assisted them with counseling, social services, job training, job 
placement, and remedial education services)37 and the Project Crossroads program 
																																								 																				
29 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2008). 
30 ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT 
OF 1974 34 (1980). (Note that the legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act is found in 
numerous reports—including S. Rep. No. 96-212 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 96-390 (1979), 
reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 805; S. Rep. No. 93-1021 (1974); H.R. 
Rep. No. 93-1508 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code. Cong. and Ad. News 7401. These 
reports are all contained in Anthony Partridge’s single volume legislative history of the Act, 
published by the Federal Judicial Center in 1980). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2008). 
32 Id. § 3161(h)(2) (emphasis added). 
33 In 1994, Mary Jo White, then the United States Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York, used a DPA to resolve a matter involving Prudential Securities. Benjamin M. 
Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of 
Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1873 & n.66 
(2005).  
34 PARTRIDGE, supra note 30, at 117 (emphasis added). 
35 Id. (emphasis added). 
36 Id. 
37 The Manhattan Court Employment Project, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE 1–7 (1970). 
2017] CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION 845 
in Washington, D.C., (which provided similar services to similar populations, but 
targeted people between the ages of sixteen and twenty-six)38 as examples of 
successful programs, adding, “[s]ome success has also been noted in programs 
where the defendant’s alleged criminality is related to a specific social problem such 
as prostitution or heroin addiction.”39 
The central question courts now grapple with is: what did Congress mean when 
it used the phrase “with the approval of the court” in subparagraph 3161(h)(2) of the 
Speedy Trial Act? Does it mean that courts are permitted to review the agreement 
provisions of a DPA to assure that those deal points are reasonable and fair? Or does 
the phrase mean that courts are limited, as the court in Fokker II concluded, to the 
following far more narrow standard of review: “assur[ing] that the DPA in fact is 
geared to enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the law, and is not 
instead a pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial Act’s time constraints.”40 
Courts will continue to grapple with this question; however, in the context of the 
Act’s legislative history, this question did not even occur to the members of 
Congress drafting the legislation. That is because when deferred prosecution is 
employed in the manner that Congress described and intended at the time of the 
bill’s passage, the resulting DPAs did not require the extensive set of agreement 
provisions found in the typical corporate DPA of today.41  
It is difficult for courts to now attempt to interpret the statute’s words “with the 
approval of the court” within the context of a corporate DPA when analysis of the 
legislative history indicates that the language of the Section 3161(h)(2) exclusion 
provision was created for a specific group of defendants who were presented with 
one particular and specific DPA provision: whether to agree to attend, and try to 
succeed within, a social rehabilitation program that the government and court 
believed would successfully address the defendant’s social, educational, and 
employment problems.  
Undergirding everything else presented in this Article is the proposition that, 
as creative as it might be to employ DPAs in the corporate context, it is questionable 
whether it is legitimate to do so. Legally, it has been suggested the government can 
continue using DPAs in this context because Congress never specifically forbade 
																																								 																				
38 ROBERTA ROVNER-PIECZENIK, NAT’L COMM. FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, PROJECT 
CROSSROADS AS PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION: A PROGRAM EVALUATION 1–2 (1970). 
39 PARTRIDGE, supra note 30, at 117. 
40 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
41 Typically, DPAs require corporate entities to (1) cooperate with the government’s 
investigation of possible wrongdoing; (2) create new (or enhance existing) internal policies 
and programs to ensure compliance with the law; (3) pay a fine or penalty; (4) admit 
wrongdoing; (5) hire an independent “monitor” to ensure the successful implementation of 
all DPA provisions; (6) waive speedy trial rights and statute of limitations defenses; and (7) 
agree to a provision prohibiting any sort of denial of the “Statement of Facts” appended to 
the agreement. Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The 
Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 18–19 (2006); 
Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business 
Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 47 (2010). 
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their use for such purposes. For example, the court in United States v. Saena Tech 
Corp.42 suggested that DPAs are not “legally improper” because “Congress provided 
the deferred-prosecution tool without limiting its use to individual defendants or to 
particular crimes.”43 However, if prosecutors had begun using DPAs to address 
alleged corporate misconduct immediately after the Speedy Trial Act’s passage in 
1974—rather than waiting two decades to do so—Congress members likely would 
have pushed back and put a stop to it. This is because the circumstances of corporate 
entities (and their directors, officers, managers, etc.) are not at all comparable to the 
circumstances of the socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who 
make up the “certain category of defendants” that Congress specifically targeted for 
assistance through deferred prosecution.44 
 
IV.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CORPORATE DPAS 
 
Part IV briefly summarizes the federal court cases that directly address judicial 
review of corporate DPAs during the approval process. Although all three federal 
district courts (issuing rulings in HSBC, Fokker I, and Saena Tech Corp.) reasoned 
they would be permitted to conduct a meaningful review of the DPAs set before 
them, the one appellate court (the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considering the 
Fokker II matter) ruled that district courts are limited to conducting DPA reviews 
that are far narrower in scope. 
 
A.  United States of America v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A45 
 
On December 11, 2012, the government charged HSBC Bank USA, N.A. with 
various violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, including failing to maintain an effective 
anti-money laundering program.46 The government also charged HSBC Holdings 
PLC with facilitating various financial transactions that violated both the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy 
Act.47 The same day, the government also filed a DPA and asked the court to hold 
the case in abeyance for five years pursuant to the terms of the agreement.48 The 
DPA stated that if the defendants complied with the provisions of the agreement, the 
government would move to dismiss all charges after five years.49 
Judge Gleeson argued that the court’s “supervisory power” gave him the 
authority to “approve or reject” the DPA.50 He cited several U.S. Supreme Court 
																																								 																				
42 140 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2015). 
43 Id. at 42. 
44 PARTRIDGE, supra note 30, at 117. 
45 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC I), No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 
3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). 
46 Id. at *1. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at *3–4. 
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cases to support the proposition that “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the 
supervisory power is to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.”51 
The court pointed out that rather than opting for a Non-Prosecution Agreement 
(“NPA”)52 or a Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss, the parties instead decided to resolve 
the matter by using a DPA.53 The court explained that although the choice might 
“produce a public relations benefit for the government,”54 it also placed a criminal 
matter onto the court’s docket, thereby “subject[ing] their DPA to the legitimate 
exercise of [the] court’s authority.”55 
The court posited that by arranging for the implementation of a DPA “within 
the confines of a pending case,” the parties were asking for the court’s “judicial 
imprimatur,” thereby leading the court to “exercise its supervisory authority over the 
DPA.”56 Although the judge conceded that exercising such authority in the DPA 
context was “novel,” he said it was “easy to imagine” many different situations 
where the agreement or its implementation “so transgress[] the bounds of lawfulness 
or propriety as to warrant judicial intervention to protect the integrity of the Court.”57 
																																								 																				
51 Id. at *4. Among other cases, the HSBC I Court cited to United States v. Payner, 447 
U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980) (“[T]he supervisory power serves the ‘twofold’ purpose of deterring 
illegality and protecting judicial integrity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), and to United 
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 526 (1983) (“[Our] cases have acknowledged the duty of 
reviewing courts to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.”). Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
52 See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, on the Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Non-
Prosecutions Agreements with Corporations to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. 
Attorneys 1 n.2 (Mar. 7, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008 
/03/20/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VHY-S6M6] 
(explaining that a DPA “is typically predicated upon the filing of a formal charging document 
by the government, and the agreement is filed with the appropriate court. In the [NPA] 
context, formal charges are not filed and the agreement is maintained by the parties rather 
than being filed with a court.”).  
53 See HSBC I, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5. 
54 Id. The judge also quotes from a press release issued by the government in the matter, 
which stated “[t]oday’s historic agreement, which imposes the largest penalty in any BSA 
prosecution to date, makes it clear that all corporate citizens, no matter how large, must be 
held accountable for their actions.” Id. at *5 n.8 (quoting Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and 
Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1478.html [https://perma.cc/ 
CA7Z-HB2X]). 
55 Id. at *5.  
56 Id. at *6. 
57 Id. at *6. The judge elaborated, saying that DPA requirements for the defendant to 
cooperate fully with the government in ongoing investigations could potentially lead to the 
violation of “a company’s attorney-client privilege and work product protections, or its 
employees’ Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.” Id. 
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The court said it would approve the DPA, but the approval would be “subject 
to a continued monitoring of its execution and implementation.”58 The court spoke 
of the “[s]ignificant deference . . . owed the Executive Branch in matters pertaining 
to prosecutorial discretion”59 and made it clear that a district court judge should be 
quite deferential to the decision to enter into a DPA.60  
The DPA required a corporate monitor to ensure that HSBC was implementing 
various remedial measures,61 as well as complying with the laws it had initially 
broken. The court explained that so long as the case was “on its docket, the Court 
retains the authority to ensure that the implementation of the DPA remains within 
the bounds of lawfulness and respects the integrity of this Court.”62 With that, the 
parties were instructed to file quarterly reports to keep the Court “apprised of all 
significant developments in the implementation of the DPA.”63  
 
B.  United States of America v. Fokker Services B.V. (Fokker I)64 
 
On June 5, 2014, the government charged Fokker Services B.V. (“Fokker”) 
with “one count of Conspiracy to Unlawfully Export U.S.-Origin Goods and 
Services to Iran, Sudan, and Burma.”65 The conspiracy, spanning five years from 
2005–2010, included more than 1,100 illegal shipments of components for aircraft 
systems and complex navigation systems; for national security reasons, the 
shipments were subject to various export control laws.66 The majority of company 
misconduct involved Iranian customers,67 and shipments to Iran continued despite 
warnings to senior management (from both in-house counsel and a company 
compliance manager handling export issues) that the shipments were illegal.68 
Moreover, the Factual Statement submitted in the case “makes clear that certain 
policies and practices were carried out with the knowledge and approval of senior 
management.”69 
On the same day the company was charged, the government filed a DPA, along 
with a motion to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act.70 Under the DPA, Fokker 
																																								 																				
58 Id. at *7. 
59 Id. at *8. 
60 Id. at *11. 
61 Id. at *10. This included placing new people into key positions within both HSBC 
North America and HSBC Holdings, addressing lack of accountability in various compliance 
programs, restructuring senior executive bonus systems so that bonuses would be tied to 
meeting compliance goals and standards, etc. Id. 
62 Id. at *11. 
63 Id. 
64 79 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.D.C. 2015). 
65 Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 161 (citations omitted). 
66 Id. 
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would acknowledge responsibility for violating the law and the government would 
agree to dismiss all charges if the company complied with all the terms of the DPA 
for a period of eighteen months.71 Those agreement terms included the following: 
the company would pay a fine, continue to cooperate with the government, 
implement enhanced compliance policies, and comply with all U.S. export laws.72 
The presiding judge was Judge Richard J. Leon of the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, who opined, “[t]he plain language of the statute 
calls for court approval, and it is this approval the parties now seek.”73 The parties 
argued the court’s role was “extremely limited” in such circumstances and the court 
should approve the DPA “unless there is an indication that (a) the defendant did not 
enter into the agreement willingly and knowingly, . . . or (b) the agreement was 
designed solely to circumvent Speedy Trial Act limits.”74  
The court disagreed and said that “a District Court has the authority ‘to approve 
or reject the DPA pursuant to its supervisory power.’”75 Indeed, the court observed, 
“it is that ‘supervisory power . . . [that] permits federal courts to supervise the 
administration of criminal justice among the parties before the bar.’”76 The judge 
explained that one important purpose of a court’s supervisory powers “is to protect 
the integrity of the judicial process,” and he quoted Judge Gleeson’s proposition 
from HSBC that “[t]he inherent supervisory power serves to ensure that the courts 
do not lend a judicial imprimatur to any aspect of a criminal proceeding that smacks 
of lawlessness or impropriety.”77 Finally, the court reasoned that although the DPA 
matter at bar was not a “typical case” for using such supervisory powers, the court 
must consider both the defendant and the public in making its ruling.78 “After all,” 
the court observed, “the integrity of judicial proceedings would be compromised by 
giving the Court’s stamp of approval to either overly-lenient prosecutorial action, or 
overly-zealous prosecutorial conduct.”79 
  
																																								 																				
71 Id. at 164. 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. (citations omitted). 
75 Id. at 165 (quoting HSBC I, No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 
1, 2013)).  
76 Id. (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
77 HSBC I, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6. 
78 Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 166. 
79 Id. 
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The court made it clear that the government “has the clear authority not to 
prosecute a case,”80 and it could have gone that route by using a Non-Prosecution 
Agreement or by not filing charges at all.81 However, the government decided 
instead to file charges against the company and to use a DPA to resolve the matter, 
leaving the criminal case “on [the] Court’s docket for the duration of the agreement’s 
term.”82 
The court explained that the parties were asking it “to lend its judicial 
imprimatur”83 to the DPA, thereby making the court an “instrument[] of law 
enforcement.”84 Noting the parties would want to “us[e] the full range of the Court’s 
powers” if the company failed to comply with the DPA, the court said: “[t]o put it 
bluntly, the Court is thus being asked to serve as the leverage over the head of the 
company.”85 
The court suggested that the terms of the DPA (i.e., having to pay a fine, 
continue to cooperate, and adhere to an eighteen-month probationary period) were 
too lenient.86 It expressed particular surprise that “under the DPA no individuals are 
being prosecuted for their conduct” and that some employees who engaged in 
misconduct were permitted to stay with the company, albeit with demotions, duty 
reassignments, and increased training requirements.87 The court also complained the 
DPA required neither that an independent monitor be employed to supervise the 
probationary period, nor that the company provide periodic reports to the court or 
government to apprise them of strides being made to comply with the law.88 “As 
such,” the judge opined, “the Court is being left to rely solely on the self-reporting 
of Fokker Services. One can only imagine how a company with such a long track 
record of deceit and illegal behavior ever convinced the Department of Justice to 
agree to that!”89 
After reviewing the entire DPA, the court stated: 
 
I cannot help but conclude that the DPA presented here is grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of Fokker Services’ conduct in a post–9/11 
world. In my judgment, it would undermine the public’s confidence in the 
administration of justice and promote disrespect for the law for it to see a 
defendant prosecuted so anemically for engaging in such egregious 
conduct for such a sustained period of time and for the benefit of one of 
our country’s worst enemies.90 
																																								 																				




84 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 166. 
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 167. 
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The court concluded by observing that the DPA “does not constitute an 
appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion” and would be rejected.91 The court 
added, “[t]o be clear, . . . I am not ordering or advising the Government, or the 
defendant, to undertake or refrain from undertaking any particular action—I am 
merely declining to approve the document before me.”92 The court made it clear that 
it would be happy to consider a “modified version” of the DPA if the parties wanted 
to try again for approval in the future.93 
 
C.  United States of America v. Saena Tech Corporation; United States of America 
v. Intelligent Decisions, Inc.94 
 
Two separate cases involving DPAs (Saena Tech Corp. and Intelligent 
Decisions) were pending before the court, so both cases were addressed in the same 
ruling. In Saena Tech Corp., the government charged the company on March 24, 
2014, with bribing a public official.95 The following month the government filed a 
joint motion for approval of a DPA, as well as exclusion of time under the Speedy 
Trial Act.96 In Intelligent Decisions, the government charged the organization on 
October 15, 2014, with paying a gratuity to a public official.97 Two weeks later the 
government filed a joint motion for approval of a DPA, as well as exclusion of time 
under the Speedy Trial Act.98  
As the matter was unfolding, the court noted “the case was ‘nontraditional’ in 
that ‘[t]here’s no one else in the courtroom raising concerns’ and ‘the Court cannot 
be an advocate.’”99 Thus, the court appointed Professor Brandon Garrett from 
University of Virginia School of Law and Dean Alan Morrison from The George 
Washington University Law School as amicus curiae to ensure a more adversarial 
process and to help the court determine if it would be fair and reasonable to use 
DPAs to resolve both cases at bar.100 
The court conducted a review of the legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act 
and concluded that the history “demonstrates that Court involvement in the deferral 
of a prosecution was specifically intended by Congress when it passed this 
legislation.”101 The court noted that although the requirement of court approval to 
exclude time under U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(2) “implies that the court must place its 
																																								 																				
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 140 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2015). 
95 Id. at 16.  
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 21. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 25. 
852 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
formal imprimatur on the agreement,”102 the statute’s language nevertheless failed 
to “grant the Court plenary power to review the agreement.”103 After analyzing the 
“arguably ambiguous text” of the statute, the court decided “that its authority under 
the Speedy Trial Act is limited to assessing whether the agreement is truly about 
diversion.”104 However, the court made clear that despite that limited authority, the 
court could nevertheless engage in a “limited review of the fairness and adequacy of 
an agreement, to the extent necessary to determine the agreement’s purpose.”105  
The court pointed out that if a DPA failed to contain any punitive provisions 
(like fines), and failed to include provisions to deter future crime (like mandating 
independent monitors and enhanced compliance programs), then that DPA was 
clearly not “designed to secure a defendant’s reformation” and therefore should be 
rejected.106 The court posited that “[e]ven [a DPA] that contained some of these 
elements could be ineffective if the obligations were found to be so vague or minimal 
as to render them a sham.”107 Accordingly, the court concluded that it retained 
“limited” authority under the Speedy Trial Act “to consider the terms of a [DPA] to 
determine whether they provide the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate good 
conduct while prosecution is deferred.”108 
As previous courts had held, this court also concluded that it held supervisory 
powers concerning DPAs,109 flowing from its “being asked to place its formal 
imprimatur on the [DPAs], to hold open two federal criminal cases, and to make 
various findings with respect to the Speedy Trial Act.”110 The court then set forth 
what it determined to be the appropriate standard of review when a district court is 
considering approving or rejecting a DPA: the court must determine “(1) whether 
[the agreement] is truly intended to hold prosecution in abeyance while a defendant 
demonstrates rehabilitation, as required by the Speedy Trial Act; and (2) whether 
the agreement involves the Court in the type of illegal or untoward activity that 
might impugn the Court’s integrity.”111 The court implied, however, that the 
standard might in fact not be that limited; the court said that since both cases at bar 
met this standard for approval, the court didn’t “have occasion to set forth the full 
scope of a district court’s authority to review and reject a [DPA],”112 and “[n]othing 
in this Opinion should be interpreted to approve the judicial abdication of this review 
authority.”113 
																																								 																				
102 Id. at 29. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 30. 
105 Id. at 31. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. (emphasis added). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 34. 
110 Id. at 33. 
111 Id. at 46. 
112 Id. (emphasis added). 
113 Id.  
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Finally, the court explained that since both cases would remain pending on its 
docket, both companies would be required to file “periodic reports to update the 
Court” on how the agreement was being implemented.114 
 
D.  United States of America v. Fokker Services B.V. (Fokker II)115 
 
The appellate court began its opinion by declaring, “[t]he [U.S.] Constitution 
allocates primacy in criminal charging decisions to the Executive Branch.”116 The 
court opined that “it has long been settled” that the Judiciary can neither “second-
guess” nor “impose its own . . . preferences” with respect to those decisions—
including “decisions about whether to initiate charges, whom to prosecute, which 
charges to bring, and whether to dismiss charges once brought.”117 
The court then observed that in certain situations, rather than pursue a criminal 
conviction or issue a declination, “the Executive may conclude that the public 
interest warrants the intermediate option of a deferred prosecution agreement 
(DPA).”118 The court explained that in the case at bar, appellant Fokker Services 
(“Fokker”) voluntarily disclosed to the government that it had potentially violated 
federal export control and other laws.119 The government decided to dispose of the 
matter through the use of an eighteen-month DPA, under which Fokker would 
continue cooperating with the government, as well as implement “a substantial 
compliance program.”120 On the same day the DPA was filed, the government filed 
criminal charges against Fokker,121 along with a joint motion to exclude time under 
the Speedy Trial Act.122 The appellate court stated: “[t]he district court denied the 
motion because, in [that] court’s view, the prosecution had been too lenient in 
agreeing to, and structuring, the DPA. Among other objections, the court disagreed 
with prosecutors’ decision to forgo bringing any criminal charges against individual 
company officers.”123 
The appellate court vacated the district court’s ruling and stated: 
 
We hold that the Act confers no authority in a court to withhold exclusion 
of time pursuant to a DPA based on concerns that the government should 
bring different charges or should charge different defendants. Congress, in 
providing for courts to approve the exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA, 
																																								 																				
114 Id. at 47. 
115 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 




120 Id.  
121 Id. at 737–39. The one-count information, filed on June 5, 2014, charged Fokker 
with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
371; 50 U.S.C. § 1705. Id. at 739. 
122 Id. at 737. 
123 Id. at 737–38. 
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acted against the backdrop of long-settled understandings about the 
independence of the Executive with regard to charging decisions. Nothing 
in the statute’s terms or structure suggests any intention to subvert those 
constitutionally rooted principles so as to enable the Judiciary to second-
guess the Executive’s exercise of discretion over the initiation and 
dismissal of criminal charges.  
 
In vacating the district court order, we have no occasion to disagree (or 
agree) with that court’s concerns about the government’s charging 
decisions in this case. Rather, the fundamental point is that those 
determinations are for the Executive—not the courts—to make.124 
 
The court went on to explain that “[t]he Executive’s primacy in criminal 
charging decisions is long settled,” and cited numerous opinions supporting that 
proposition.125 The appellate court noted that, “[c]orrespondingly, ‘judicial authority 
is . . . at its most limited’ when reviewing the Executive’s exercise of discretion over 
charging determinations.”126 Thus, the appellate court said, “the 
Judiciary . . . generally is not ‘competent to undertake’ that sort of inquiry.”127 
“Indeed ‘[f]ew subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the 
Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal 
proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a 
proceeding once brought.’”128 The appellate court reasoned that such “settled 
principles counsel against interpreting statutes and rules in a manner that would 
impinge on the Executive’s constitutionally rooted primacy over criminal charging 
decisions.”129  
The appellate court furthermore opined that the language of Section 3161(h)(2) 
“ties the ‘approval of the court’ requirement to the DPA’s ‘purpose of allowing the 
defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.’”130 With such an understanding, the 
appellate court reasoned that a district court’s authority to approve an exclusion of 
time for a DPA has “a particular focus: i.e., to assure that the DPA in fact is geared 
to enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the law, and is not instead 
a pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial Act’s time constraints.”131 The 
appellate court made no effort to define “the precise contours”132 of a district court’s 
authority “to confirm that a DPA’s conditions are aimed to assure the defendant’s 
																																								 																				
124 Id. at 738. 
125 Id. at 741 (citations omitted). 
126 Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986)). 
127 Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). 
128 Id. (quoting Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). 
129 Id. at 742. 
130 Id. at 744 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2008)). 
131 Id.  
132 Id. 
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good conduct.”133 However, the court stated that authority “does not permit the 
[district] court to impose its own views about the adequacy of the underlying 
criminal charges. Rather . . . those core charging decisions remain the province of 
the Executive.”134 
The appellate court explained that it disagreed with the contention, put forth by 
amicus, that a district court’s review of a DPA under Section 3161(h)(2) is analogous 
to a court’s review of a plea agreement under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.135 The appellate court observed that (1) trial judges “lack[] 
authority to reject a proposed [plea] agreement based on mere disagreement with a 
prosecutor’s underlying charging decisions[;]”136 and (2) “trial judges are not free to 
withhold approval of guilty pleas . . . merely because their conception of the public 
interest differs from that of the prosecuting attorney.”137  
The appellate court then concluded that the district court erred, and exceeded 
its authority, in denying the motion for exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act 
because “[t]here [was] no indication that the parties entered into the DPA to evade 
speedy trial limits rather than to enable Fokker to demonstrate its good conduct and 
compliance with the law.”138 Instead, the appellate court said the district court 
criticized the government for not charging individuals within the company, for not 
requiring the company to pay a higher fine, and for not requiring an independent 
monitor to supervise the DPA139—all decisions falling under “the prosecution’s 
exercise of charging authority.”140  
 
V.  ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR COURT OPINIONS 
 
Part V attempts to undergird the Article’s core conclusions that prosecutors’ 
discretionary powers in using corporate DPAs should be confined and checked 
through meaningful judicial review, that the Fokker II ruling fails to ensure such 
review, and that future courts addressing similar legal issues might move in a 
direction different from that of Fokker II. The key propositions put forth in Part V 
include the following: First, a district court’s authority to review a corporate DPA is 
far more expansive than the Fokker II court held. Second, language within the 
Speedy Trial Act mandates court approval of the DPA deferral itself, along with the 
agreement terms that effectuate that deferral. Third, given that the form and function 
of DPAs have strong similarities to plea agreements, a district court’s review of a 
proposed DPA could be considered analogous to a court’s review of a proposed plea 
agreement under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Fourth, 
																																								 																				
133 Id. at 744–45.  
134 Id. at 745 (emphasis added). 
135 Id. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 745 (quoting United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 
1973)). 
138 Id. at 746. 
139 Id. at 746–47. 
140 Id. at 742.  
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providing district courts the power to review DPA agreement terms in no way 
interferes with the government’s complete and unfettered discretion with respect to 
charging decisions (i.e., whether to charge, when to charge, whom to charge, and 
what charges to bring or dismiss). And fifth, district courts have a long history of 
competently reviewing plea agreements and consent orders, and those courts are 
equally competent to review the agreement terms forming the basis of DPAs. 
Moreover, a critical role played by the court in all three forms of alternative dispute 
resolution (plea deals, consent orders, and DPAs) is to protect the public interest—
especially in cases involving corporate entities, which can potentially cause serious 
public harm. 
 
A.  Foundational Issues 
 
The tension inherent in all four court opinions is vividly on display in the HSBC 
matter. On one hand, the HSBC district court said it is “easy to imagine” many 
different situations where a DPA agreement or its implementation “so transgress[] 
the bounds of lawfulness or propriety as to warrant judicial intervention to protect 
the integrity of the Court.”141 Yet, on the other hand, the HSBC district court 
simultaneously said there is “[s]ignificant deference . . . owed the Executive Branch 
in matters pertaining to prosecutorial discretion,”142 and thus a district court judge 
should be quite deferential “to the decision to enter into a [DPA].”143 Because the 
HSBC district court approved that particular DPA, it did not have to confront the 
tricky issue of what would have happened if it had not done so. It seems there would 
have been a conflict between the court’s supervisory powers to reject the agreement 
to protect the court’s integrity, versus the government’s prosecutorial discretion to 
enter into the agreement. 
All three district courts—ruling respectively in the HSBC, Fokker I, and Saena 
Tech Corp. matters—agree that the court’s supervisory power can be employed to 
protect the integrity of the court from problematic DPAs. As the Fokker I court put 
it: “the integrity of judicial proceedings would be compromised by giving the 
Court’s stamp of approval to either overly-lenient prosecutorial action, or overly-
zealous prosecutorial conduct.”144  
And although the Saena Tech Corp. court initially determined “that its 
authority under the Speedy Trial Act is limited to assessing whether the agreement 
is truly about diversion,”145 the court later says its authority to review agreements 
under its supervisory powers expands its capabilities for DPA approval in certain 
regards. Specifically, the court states that a particularly “unfair or lenient”146 DPA 
																																								 																				
141 HSBC I, No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). 
142 Id. at *7. 
143 Id. at *8. 
144 Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 167 (D.D.C. 2015). 
145 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 30 (D.D.C. 2015). 
146 Id. at 35. 
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agreement might “involv[e] the Court in something inappropriate” and could 
therefore be rejected.147  
In this regard, the Saena Tech Corp. court seems to be having it both ways: the 
court said its authority is limited to determining whether agreements are truly about 
diversion, and yet the court said it could also reject agreements if it deemed them to 
be too harsh or too lenient. If the Saena Tech Corp. court had decided to reject the 
two DPA agreements set before it (instead of deciding to approve them both), the 
ruling probably would have met the same fate as the Fokker I case: the decision 
likely would have been appealed by the government along with the two defendant 
parties, all of whom supported judicial approval of the agreements. 
 
B.  Scope of Authority 
 
Central to all four court opinions is a determination of the scope of a federal 
district court’s authority to exclude the period of delay in the context of corporate 
DPAs. As stated earlier, the Speedy Trial Act states that a defendant’s trial must 
begin within seventy days after the government files an information or indictment.148 
Relevant here is the following exclusion provision: “[a]ny period of delay during 
which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written 
agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of 
allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”149 
In interpreting the provision, the Fokker II court ruled that a court’s approval 
authority for exclusion of time has a “particular focus: i.e., to assure that the DPA in 
fact is geared to enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the law, and 
is not instead a pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial Act’s time 
constraints.”150 Thus, the appellate court said, a federal district court must “confine[] 
its inquiry to examining whether the DPA served the purpose of allowing [the 
defendant] to demonstrate its good conduct.”151  
However, there are several arguments to support the contention that the review 
authority could in fact be interpreted as more expansive. First, in DPA agreements 
used to resolve matters in the decade leading up to the Fokker I case, the government 
itself consistently interpreted Section 3161(h)(2) far more broadly. Specifically, it 
was customary for the government to include language in the DPA stating that (1) 
the agreement must be “approved” by a federal district court and (2) the reviewing 
court was entitled, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(2), to decline approval 




148 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2008). 
149 Id. § 3161(h)(2) (emphasis added). 
150 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 773, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
151 Id. at 747. 
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• In U.S. v. Robert S. Furst, the DPA states that “the Agreement to defer 
prosecution of defendant Furst must be approved by the Court, in 
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2). Should the Court decline to 
approve a deferred prosecution for any reason, . . . this Agreement shall 
be null and void.”152 
 
• In U.S. v. BankAtlantic, the DPA states that “the Agreement to defer 
prosecution of BankAtlantic must be approved by the Court, in accordance 
with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2). Should the Court decline to approve a 
deferred prosecution for any reason, . . . this Agreement shall be null and 
void.”153 
 
• In U.S. v. BP America Inc., the DPA states that “the Agreement to defer 
prosecution of BP America must be approved by the Court, in accordance 
with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2). Should the Court decline to approve the 
Agreement to defer prosecution for any reason, both BP America and the 
Department [of Justice] are released from all obligations imposed upon 
them by this Agreement . . . .”154 
 
Throughout the decade preceding Fokker I, these exact same phrases—i.e., 
“must be approved by the Court” and “[s]hould the Court decline to approve a 
deferred prosecution for any reason”—were used in DPAs for numerous other cases, 
including U.S. v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC,155 U.S. v. Honey Holding I, LTD.,156 U.S. 
v. Groeb Farms, Inc.,157 Re: Science Applications Int’l. Corp.,158 Re: KPMG,159 Re: 
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,160 U.S. v. UBS AG,161 and U.S. v. Love Irrigation, 
																																								 																				
152 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 13, United States v. Furst, No. H-03-363 (S.D. 
Tex. May 14, 2010) (emphasis added). 
153 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 9, United States v. BankAtlantic, No. 06-
60126 (S.D. Fla. April 27, 2006) (emphasis added). 
154 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 26, United States v. BP America Inc., No. 07 
CR 683 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2007) (emphasis added). 
155 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 4, United States v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, 
No. CR-09-007 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2009). 
156 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 10, United States v. Honey Holding I, LTD., 
No. 13 CR 138 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
157 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 10, United States v. Groeb Farms, Inc., No. 13 
CR 137 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2013). 
158 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 8, Re: Science Applications Int’l Corp., No. 
11-CR-121 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012). 
159 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 11, Re: KPMG, No. 05-CR-903 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 29, 2005). 
160 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 13, Re: JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-
CR-___ (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014). 
161 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 15, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033-
CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2009). 
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Inc.162 In U.S. v. America Online, Inc., the DPA states simply, “[s]hould the Court 
decline to approve the Agreement to defer prosecution for any reason, this 
Agreement shall be null and void.”163  
It appears, then, that the government interpreted, over many years, the language 
in Section 3161(h)(2) to mean it was mandatory for federal district courts to subject 
DPAs to an approval process, and that such approval could be declined by the court 
for any reason. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that similar histories of 
interpretation are entitled to significant deference. Indeed, the Court has “long 
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”164 The 
Court also stated in Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby165 (an 1827 case that was later cited 
in the seminal case of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council166) that “[i]n 
the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the cotemporaneous construction 
of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its 
provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.”167 Moreover, the 
government’s interpretation was relied upon by the public, and by practicing 
attorneys,168 for at least a decade leading up to Fokker I. In fact, in a January 2014 
DPA put forth by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York—just 
five months before the government filed charges in Fokker I—the government was 
still using the “[s]hould the Court decline to approve the Agreement to defer 
prosecution for any reason” language.169 However, in appealing the court’s Fokker 
I ruling, the government appears to change course, arguing to the appellate court that 
although the Speedy Trial Act fails to define the standard for time exclusion, the Act 
nevertheless “appears to ‘instruct courts to consider whether a deferred prosecution 
																																								 																				
162 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 10, United States v. Love Irrigation, Inc., No. 
3:11cr91HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. May 22, 2012). 
163 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 4, United States v. America Online, Inc., No. 
1:04 M 1133 (E.D. Va. 2005) (emphasis added). 
164 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 & n.14 (1984). 
165 25 U.S. 206 (1827). 
166 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 n.14. 
167 Darby, 25 U.S. at 210. 
168 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 324 (2012) (discussing the Prior-Construction Canon, the authors state: 
“Perhaps the best explanation for the [canon] is this: The word or phrase at issue is a statutory 
term used in a particular field of law (to which the statute at issue belongs). When that term 
has been authoritatively interpreted by a high court, or has been given uniform interpretation 
by the lower courts or the responsible agency, the members of the bar practicing in that field 
reasonably enough assume that, in statutes pertaining to that field, the term bears this same 
meaning.”). 
169 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 13, Re: JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-
CR-___ (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014) (emphasis added). 
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agreement is truly about diversion and not simply a vehicle for fending off a looming 
trial date.’”170  
This new interpretation is obviously far more restrictive than the previous 
interpretation of allowing courts to decline DPA approval for “any reason.” U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the government’s new interpretation of 
Section 3161(h)(2) is entitled to far less deference than its previous, consistently 
held interpretation. Specifically, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,171 the Court said that 
“[a]n agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's 
earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently 
held agency view.”172 In addition, the well-established canon of statutory 
interpretation guided by the Skidmore doctrine bolsters the view that, although 
language in Section 3161(h)(2) was ambiguous, courts should nevertheless uphold 
the interpretation that had been consistently put forth by the government.173 
According to Professor Dan Kahan, 
 
Courts routinely give Skidmore deference to Justice Department readings. 
The most prominent examples come from antitrust law, in which the 
Department’s interpretations, although not imbued with formal legal 
effect, are nonetheless routinely engrafted by courts into controlling rules 
of law. Courts also accord substantial weight to the Justice Department’s 
reading of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act. It would 
be perfectly consistent with these lines of authority to apply Skidmore 
deference to the Justice Department’s readings of ambiguous criminal 
statutes.174  
 
Professor Kahan adds that it is the criminal law context “in which the relevant 
considerations—from expertise, to uniformity, to accountability, to rule of law 
values—all support giving conclusive weight to the Department’s considered 
views.”175 For many years, the government’s “considered view” in interpreting 
Section 3161(h)(2) was that district courts could decline DPA approval for any 
reason. This longstanding interpretation was dramatically narrowed through the 
Fokker II ruling. 
																																								 																				
170 Government’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement Reached with Fokker Services B.V at 12, Fokker I, No. 14-CR-121 (RJL), 
(D.D.C. July 18, 2014) (citing HSBC I, 12-CR-00763-JG, Document 23, at 6). 
171 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
172 Id. at 446 n.30 (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)). 
173 See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 469, 508 (1996) (discussing how both the Chevron and Skidmore doctrines “support[] 
judicial acquiescence in executive branch interpretations. Indeed, courts often give 
substantial if not controlling weight to the readings of agencies. . . that lack delegated 
lawmaking powers but that nonetheless possess important enforcement responsibilities.”). 
174 Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
175 Id. 
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An exchange that occurred during oral argument of Fokker II, in the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, helped shed more light on the government’s sudden 
revised interpretation of Section 3161(h)(2). At one point, the Court states that the 
statute makes clear that when the government and a defendant jointly file a DPA 
with a district court, “[t]here’s always some risk that the court is not going to approve 
of the deal.”176 Counsel responds, “[i]t’s never happened before, Judge. It actually 
has never happened before. And that’s part of the calculation that the company 
makes, and other companies make.”177 This exchange suggests that the 
government’s initial interpretation of Section 3161(h)(2) (i.e., that a district court 
can reject a DPA “for any reason”) was likely left in place for all those years simply 
because it did not seem to influence courts in either direction; in other words, the 
rubberstamping of agreements by district courts was so routine that, despite the 
ability to reject “for any reason,” approval nevertheless appeared to be guaranteed. 
Indeed, it appears that reliance on district court approval of DPAs came to be “part 
of the calculation” when companies decided whether to resolve allegations of 
wrongdoing through deferred prosecution.178 As the appellate court suggested 
during oral argument, however, the government should have known there was in fact 
a risk of rejection, however small that risk appeared to be based on the history of 
district courts routinely rubberstamping agreements. That is exactly what an Article 
III, independent judge is permitted to do: to rule “yes” or “no” on a request by the 
government.179 
In addition, Fokker II puts forth the pivotal assertion that “[t]he statutory 
language ties the ‘approval of the court’ requirement to the DPA’s ‘purpose of 
allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.’”180 Here again is the 
excerpt from the statute: “[a]ny period of delay during which prosecution is deferred 
by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the 
defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant 
to demonstrate his good conduct.”181 
Contrary to Fokker II’s assertion, there is a strong argument, founded in 
English grammar, that the phrase “with the approval of the court” actually modifies 
the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.182 The phrase it immediately follows 
																																								 																				
176 Oral argument at 19:20, Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2016.nsf/2963B2550D4F056F85257E
BD00525404/$file/15-3016.mp3 [https://perma.cc/S8J4-5EPB]. 
177 Id. at 19:25. 
178 Id. 
179 See Tracey E. George, Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III 
Protections, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 221, 221–26 (2003). 
180 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) 
(2008)). 
181 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2008) (emphasis added). 
182 See Richard Nordquist, Glossary of Grammatical and Rhetorical Terms, 
THOUGHTCO. (Oct. 24, 2016), http://grammar.about.com/od/rs/g/referentterm.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4SB2-JMYQ]. (“In English grammar, a referent is the person, thing, or idea 
that a word or expression denotes, stands for, or refers to. For example, the referent of the 
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is: “[a]ny period of delay during which prosecution is deferred . . . pursuant to 
written agreement with the defendant.”183 This means the statutory language is 
mandating court approval of the deferral and the written agreement effectuating that 
deferral. The U.S. Supreme Court comes to the same conclusion in Barnhart v. 
Thomas,184 explaining the grammatical rule that “a limiting clause or 
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it 
immediately follows.”185 Under this interpretation, the district court would have the 
authority to consider a DPA’s agreement terms in making its approval decision, 
rather than having to “confine[] its inquiry to examining whether the DPA served 
the purpose of allowing [the defendant] to demonstrate its good conduct.”186 
This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that, under the interpretation put forth 
by Fokker II, the phrase “with the approval of the court” is rendered superfluous. 
Consider the language of Section 3161(h)(2) with the words “with the approval of 
the court” being omitted. The provision would then read: “[a]ny period of delay 
during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant 
to written agreement with the defendant for the purpose of allowing the defendant 
to demonstrate his good conduct.” 
Even with the language removed, a district court’s task in deciding if an 
exception under Section 3161(h)(2) applies would nevertheless be the same: to 
assess whether the DPA was serving “the purpose of allowing the defendant to 
demonstrate his good conduct.” Thus, under Fokker II’s interpretation, the words 
“with the approval of the court” are unnecessary and have no consequence. The 
statute would have the same meaning and effect without them—an interpretation 
that violates the Surplusage Canon.187 As Thomas M. Cooley states: “the courts 
must . . . lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, 
rather than one which may make some idle and nugatory.”188  
																																								 																				
word door is the object ‘door.’ Referring words are words, such as pronouns, that point back 
to other items in a text (anaphoric reference) or (less commonly) point ahead to a later part 
of the text (cataphoric reference).” (emphasis added)).  
183 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2008). 
184 540 U.S. 20 (2003). 
185 Id. at 26 (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 47.33 (6th ed. 2000) (“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary 
intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.”)). See also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 140 (2012) (discussing 
the Grammar Canon, which states: “Words are to be given the meaning that proper grammar 
and usage would assign them.”). 
186 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
187 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 168, at 174 (quoting the Surplusage Cannon which 
reads “If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu 
sunt accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation 
that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”). 
188 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS: WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 58 (1972). 
See also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“These words cannot be meaningless, 
else they would not have been used.”). 
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Moreover, legislative history points out that Assistant Attorney General W. 
Vincent Rakestraw, in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, proposed 
deleting the phrase “with the approval of the court” from the legislation because 
“[i]nvolving the court in this type of prosecutorial decision would seemingly violate 
the doctrine of separation of powers.”189 Yet the Committee did not act on 
Rakestraw’s proposal, lending still more credence to the notion that Congress felt 
those words were necessary and not superfluous to the successful operation of the 
statute.190 
To support a more expansive reading of a district court’s approval authority 
under Section 3161(h)(2), amicus curiae in Fokker II analogized a court’s review of 
a DPA under Section 3161(h)(2) to a court’s review of a proposed plea agreement 
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.191 Although the argument 
failed to persuade the appellate court, on balance one could easily have sided with 
amicus on the matter. Fokker II states that the context of a DPA is “markedly 
different” from that of a plea agreement, and goes on to say it is “more like a 
dismissal under Rule 48(a).”192 Specifically, the appellate court states that although 
plea agreements involve convictions and sentences, DPAs do not—indeed, “the 
entire object of a DPA is to enable the defendant to avoid criminal conviction and 
sentence by demonstrating good conduct and compliance with the law.”193 
According to the appellate court, a district court, in approving a DPA, “merely 
approves the prosecution’s judgment that further pursuit of criminal charges is 
unwarranted, as it does when it approves a prosecutor’s motion to dismiss charges 
under Rule 48(a).”194 
This reasoning falls short of the mark in several respects. First, contrary to the 
assertion in Fokker II, the “entire object” of a DPA is far more comprehensive than 
enabling a defendant to avoid criminal conviction and sentence by demonstrating 
good conduct and compliance with the law. The object of a DPA is manifold, as 
former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer explains:  
 
in many ways, a DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative 
effect as a guilty plea: when a company enters into a DPA with the 
government . . . it almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing, agree to 
cooperate with the government’s investigation, pay a fine, agree to 
improve its compliance program, and agree to face prosecution if it fails 
to satisfy the terms of the agreement. All of these components of DPAs 
are critical for accountability.195  
 
																																								 																				
189 PARTRIDGE, supra note 30, at 117–18. 
190 See id. 
191 Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 745. 
192 Id. at 746. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Breuer, supra note 9. 
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Professor Brandon Garrett tells us DPAs and similar agreements can be used 
by the government to bring about “structural reform”—including “sweeping internal 
reforms”—within corporate entities.196 In addition, by agreeing to a DPA, 
defendants thereby waive their rights under the Speedy Trial Act—waivers that 
district courts must ensure are engaged in both knowingly and voluntarily.197  
Thus, in approving a DPA, a district court does far more than “merely approve[] 
the prosecution’s judgment that further pursuit of criminal charges is 
unwarranted,”198 as Fokker II asserts. Although the end result of using a DPA is 
usually the dismissal of charges,199 it does not mean that a district court’s approval 
of a DPA can or should be likened to a court’s approval of a motion to dismiss 
charges under Rule 48(a).200 Specifically, as Fokker II points out, there is a long and 
settled history of the extreme deference that courts give to prosecutors dismissing 
charges under Rule 48(a).201 However, it is a leap for the appellate court to then 
suggest that the operation of a DPA is less like a plea agreement and more like a 
dismissal under Rule 48(a).202 The implication, of course, is that both of these 
mechanisms for dismissing charges—the DPA and Rule 48(a)—might be similar 
with respect to the amount of deference that is owed by a district court to the 
government when the government employs either of them. But given that DPAs are 
created with the explicit goal of accomplishing far more than merely dismissing the 
case, surely those agreements are owed a greater depth and degree of judicial review 
than are motions to dismiss under Rule 48(a)—a simple and straightforward motion 
that involves no waiver of speedy trial rights, no acknowledgment of wrongdoing, 
no imposition of a fine, no agreement to beef up compliance programs or cooperate 
with government investigations, and no possibility that originally-filed charges 
might end up being prosecuted by the government if it declares a breach has 
occurred—all provisions that burden the defendant and that form the core of most 
																																								 																				
196 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (2007). 
197 PARTRIDGE, supra note 30, at 116 (reporting that former Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Daniel A. Rezneck testified in Senate Hearings for the Speedy Trial Act that since deferred 
prosecutions have “some of the elements of a plea bargain and . . . result in a pro tanto waiver 
of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial, approval by the court on the record is a wise and 
necessary safeguard.”). 
198 Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 746. 
199 Dismissal of charges is contingent, of course, on whether the government determines 
that the defendant has satisfactorily met all the requirements of the DPA agreement. See 
Kristie Xian, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the Context of 
Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 631, 644–45 (2014) (stating 
that “[t]hese agreements often include provisions in which the government is listed as the 
sole decider as to whether a breach has occurred. As a result, the question of whether a 
company actually breached the agreement is not subject to an objective trier-of-fact’s 
judgment, but posed to the government, which might have an ancillary interest in protecting 
the status of ‘successful’ deferred prosecution agreements.”).  
200 Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 746. 
201 Id. at 741 (citing Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). 
202 Contra id. at 746–47. 
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DPA agreements.203 Instead, a Rule 48(a) action leads to an immediate dismissal and 
nothing more.  
In addition, the form and function of DPAs have strong similarities to plea 
agreements: (1) both are ADR vehicles that address matters without going to trial; 
(2) both involve the government and defendant negotiating a final agreement in 
order to resolve the issue; and (3) defendants using either ADR vehicle could 
potentially fall victim to the so-called “innocence problem”204 (occurring when 
defendants decide to agree to a DPA or plea deal even though they never engaged in 
the alleged wrongdoing).205 In a plea agreement, defendants agree to accept guilt 
(unless it’s an Alford plea)206 and conviction without a trial in order to receive a 
lesser charge or sentence from the government.207 Similarly, in a DPA, defendants 
agree to accept a host of provisions negotiated with the government in order to 
receive a dismissal of all charges upon successful completion of those provisions. 
Finally, former Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel A. Rezneck testified in Senate 
Hearings for the Speedy Trial Act that deferred prosecution has clear similarities to 
a plea deal.208  
																																								 																				
203 See Xian, supra note 199, at 644–45; see also First, supra note 41, at 47. 
204 The innocence problem “is the recognition that when a prosecutor offers a defendant 
the opportunity to plead guilty in exchange for a more lenient punishment, the offer may lead 
an innocent defendant to plead guilty.” Adam N. Stern, Note, Plea Bargaining, Innocence, 
and the Prosecutor’s Duty to “Do Justice,” 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1027 (2012) 
(citation omitted). See also Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea 
Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 561, 601–03 (2014) 
(discussing that “there are serious consequences in terms of trial penalties for defendants 
who do not accept plea deals. This may make it more likely that innocent defendants will 
feel the pressure and decide to plead guilty.”). 
205 Reilly, supra note 14, at 350. 
206 Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal 
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1363 
(2003) (explaining that in Alford pleas, “defendants plead guilty while simultaneously 
protesting their innocence”). 
207 Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to 
Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 
3607 (2013) (“There are two broad categories of plea negotiations, each of which generally 
entails concessions on the part of both the prosecution and the defendant: charge bargaining 
and sentence bargaining. In charge bargaining, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in 
exchange for the dropping of some charges or the decrease in their severity. In sentence 
bargaining, the prosecution agrees to recommend a lesser sentence in return for the guilty 
plea. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and many plea agreements will contain 
elements of both.”) (citations omitted); see also Greenblum, supra note 33, at 1869 (“A guilty 
plea [in plea bargaining] results in a conviction and collateral consequences attach no 
differently than if the offender had been convicted in a trial.”) (citation omitted). 
208 PARTRIDGE, supra note 30, at 116 (testifying that deferred prosecutions have “some 
of the elements of a plea bargain.”). 
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Moreover, although Fokker II is correct to say that DPAs do not technically 
involve convictions and sentences,209 DPA provisions effectively translate into the 
same thing. As one group of commentators puts it:  
 
[A] DPA amounts in sum and substance to a guilty plea and a conviction; 
the corporate defendant must admit facts sufficient to support a finding of 
guilt, pay substantial fines and/or forfeiture, and typically subject itself to 
government oversight for the length of the deferral period—in essence a 
probationary period.210 
 
One scholar, in an article entitled “Kinds of Punishment,” writes that “[s]ome 
of the most innovative and creative ‘punishments’ are imposed on corporations 
pursuant to deferred prosecution agreements.”211 To further support the view that 
DPAs include penalties or fines that in effect amount to a “sentence,” it is interesting 
to note that in many DPA agreements, the government uses the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines to determine the applicable fine range.212 The Sentencing Guidelines 
were used, for example, to help calculate fines in the following agreements: U.S. v. 
Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC,213 U.S. v. Latam Airlines Group S.A.,214 
U.S. v. Embraer S.A.,215 U.S. v. Olympus Latin America, Inc.,216 and Re: Smith & 
Nephew, Inc.217 
Perhaps the greatest similarity between plea agreements and DPAs is that, in 
both ADR processes, the government holds the majority of power during the entire 
process. In plea agreements, prosecutors serve “not only as prosecutor but [also] as 
																																								 																				
209 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
210 Rush et al., supra note 5, at 2. 
211 Douglas Husak, Kinds of Punishment (Apr. 1, 2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2979458 [https://perma.cc/V8KN-Z5G9]. 
212 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2008) The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual is written and updated by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, which is charged with promulgating guidelines for federal 
sentencing.  
213 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 7, United States v. Och-Ziff Capital 
Management Group LLC, No. 16-516 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
214 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 7, United States v. Latam Airlines Group S.A., 
No. 16-60195-CR-HURLEY (S.D. Fla. 2016).  
215 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 7, United States v. Embraer S.A., No. 16-
60294-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. 2016). 
216 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 7, United States v. Olympus Latin America, 
Inc., No. 16-3525 (MF) (D.N.J. 2016). 
217 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 5, Re: Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 1:12-cr-
00030-RBW (D.D.C. 2012). 
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quasi-judge and jury.”218 And the same can be said with respect to DPAs, where 
prosecutors are given “unmitigated power to be judge, jury and sentencer.”219  
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines state in connection with plea deals that “when 
the dismissal of charges . . . is contingent on acceptance of a plea agreement, the 
court’s authority to adjudicate guilt and impose sentence is implicated, and the court 
is to determine whether dismissal of charges will undermine the sentencing 
guidelines.”220 Given that DPAs are so similar in form and function to plea 
agreements, this same reasoning should apply in the DPA context: because the 
dismissal of charges is contingent on the defendant’s acceptance of a DPA, (1) the 
court’s authority to adjudicate guilt and impose sentence is implicated, and (2) the 
court should be permitted to determine whether or not the fine or dismissal of 
charges would undermine the sentencing guidelines. This idea comports well with 
the judiciary’s “traditional power over criminal sentencing.”221 Moreover, a similar 
idea, using similar reasoning, was put forth in a law review article published in 1974, 
when pretrial diversion programs were first being introduced.222 This will be 
discussed further in Part VI, below. 
 
C.  Charging Discretion 
 
Perhaps the most misdirected proposition put forth by Fokker II is the idea that 
DPA agreement provisions are the functional equivalent of prosecutorial charging 
decisions, and that federal district courts therefore lack the competence to review 
them.223  
There are few areas of law that are more firmly settled than a prosecutor’s wide 
discretion and total independence with respect to charging decisions224—meaning 
the prosecutor has complete and unfettered discretion in deciding whether to initiate 
																																								 																				
218 Stern, supra note 204, at 1035. See also Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to 
Reversing Mass Incarceration: Reforming the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea 
Bargaining, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER & CLASS 191, 194 (2015) (“Plea 
bargaining, is a form of negotiation with structural power imbalances.”). 
219 Deferred Prosecution: Should Corporate Settlement Agreements Be Without 
Guidelines? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Jud. Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. 
Law, 8th Cong. 5 (N.J. 2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (Statement of Rep. Bill Pascrell, Jr.).  
220 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2002). 
221 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 745 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
222 Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L. J. 827 (1974). 
223 The appellate court states the following: “And the Judiciary’s lack of competence to 
review the prosecution’s initiation and dismissal of charges equally applies to review of the 
prosecution’s decision to pursue a DPA and the choices reflected in the agreement’s terms. 
As with conventional charging decisions, a DPA’s provisions manifest the Executive’s 
consideration of factors such as the strength of the government’s evidence, the deterrence 
value of a prosecution, and the enforcement priorities of an agency, subjects that are ill-suited 
to substantial judicial oversight.” Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 744 (citation omitted). 
224 See id. at 741 (“The Executive’s primacy in criminal charging decisions is long 
settled. That authority stems from the Constitution’s delegation of ‘take Care’ duties, U.S. 
Const. art. II, § 3, and the pardon power, id. § 2, to the Executive Branch.”). 
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charges225 or dismiss them once brought;226 what charges to file or take before a 
grand jury;227 when to file charges;228 and whom to charge.229 However, that settled 
area of law has evolved over a period of time when nearly all criminal cases were 
settled through trial or plea agreement—both of which have powerful checks in 
place to balance the prosecutor’s charging power. For example, within a trial, the 
jury acts as a first check: if the prosecutor is unfair in charging, that can influence 
whether a jury decides to convict, not convict, or perhaps employ jury nullification 
if it believes the law is immoral or wrongly applied.230  
Given that criminal trials are conducted in public,231 the second check is 
provided by the public itself. Consider what the U.S. Supreme Court tells us about 
the ability of public trials to restrain judicial and prosecutorial power: 
 
Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be 
conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always 
been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts 
as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is 
subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an 
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.232 
 
Then, during sentencing, the judge provides yet another check on the 
government’s charging power. The judge might decide, after reflecting upon the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as well as sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a),233 to issue a sentence that more closely reflects a different charge. In plea 
agreements, the judge sits as the only check on the government’s charging power, 
but it is a powerful check nonetheless.234 For example, “[i]f a plea agreement has 
been reached by the parties which contemplates the granting of charge or sentence 
concessions by the judge, the judge should . . . give the agreement due consideration, 
																																								 																				
225 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
226 Id. 
227 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
228 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
229 United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982); accord Marshall v. 
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980). 
230 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see also Suja A. Thomas, What 
Happened to the American Jury? Proposals for Revamping Plea Bargaining and Summary 
Judgment, 43 A.B.A. LITIG. 25, 28 (2017) (“[J]ury nullification has historical origins, such 
as checking the prosecution and the legislature in response to the enactment and enforcement 
of certain laws.”). 
231 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a . . . public trial . . . .”). 
232 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). 
233 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(M). 
234 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148–49 (2012) (“[A] defendant has no right to 
be offered a plea, nor a federal right that the judge accept it.”) (citations omitted). 
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but notwithstanding its existence reach an independent decision on whether to grant 
charge or sentence concessions.”235  
However, in the context of a DPA, the prosecutor gets to control all those 
checks and balances that in trials or plea agreements would be controlled by judges, 
juries, and the watching public. Thus, by framing the agreement provisions of DPAs 
as functionally equivalent to prosecutorial charging decisions, Fokker II appears to 
be setting the law on a course that would prevent district courts from reviewing DPA 
agreement terms. While a judge should not play a role in crafting the terms of a DPA 
agreement, of course—just as a judge cannot play a role in crafting the terms of a 
plea agreement236—there are no separation of power issues with courts reviewing 
the DPA in its final form, and then deciding whether to accept or reject that 
agreement. Although the Speedy Trial Act does not provide any guidance or 
standards for courts in making the decision to accept or reject a DPA, the same is 
true for courts when they decide to accept or reject plea agreements under Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.237 
Moreover, in Fokker I, as in all other federal cases involving DPAs, the 
government did have complete and unfettered discretion in charging: the 
government independently determined the charges in the case, and then filed those 
charges. The DPA was filed as an entirely separate document.238 Specifically, the 
government filed a one-count information against Fokker, charging the company 
with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.239 
Concurrently, the government filed a DPA with the court. Even though these two 
documents are sometimes filed together, creating and filing a DPA is part of a 
separate and alternative process from the traditional litigation process set into 
motion with filing charges. The Washington Supreme Court sets forth the idea 
succinctly: “once the accused has been charged and is before the court, the charging 
function ceases.”240 Similarly, in Fokker I, once the government filed a one-count 
information against the Fokker company, the charging function ceased.  
Although Fokker II likens DPA agreement provisions to “conventional 
charging decisions,”241 communications between the government and the defendant 
in deciding to pursue a DPA, and in crafting the provisions that will make up the 
agreement itself, all take place outside the parameters of the court and outside the 
protection of the rules and procedures that have been written over the last decades 
																																								 																				
235 AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 127 
(3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publication 
s/criminal_justice_standards/pleas_guilty.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/FHB7-
2R5B]. 
236 FED R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
237 FED R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3). 
238 Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 163 (D.D.C. 2015). 
239 Id. at 161. 
240 Washington ex rel. Schillberg v. Cascade Dist. Court, 621 P.2d 115, 119 (Wash. 
1980) (emphasis added). 
241 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
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to ensure a just and fair process within the traditional litigation context.242 The two 
processes—traditional litigation versus deferred prosecution—might be seen as two 
separate trains placed along parallel, but separate, tracks. One train (the DPA that 
has been filed) is awaiting acceptance or rejection by the district court. The second 
train (the charge in the form of the one-count information that has been filed) is 
waiting for the court’s ruling in the DPA matter before it will be addressed, i.e., 
before the government decides whether to move forward with prosecution of the 
charge.  
If the district court approves the DPA, the terms of the agreement can be met 
during the deferral period, and the government can then move to dismiss the charge 
from the one-count information. Or, the defendant might fail to successfully carry 
out the terms of the DPA and the government will then have to decide whether to 
prosecute its originally-filed charge. If the district court rejects the DPA, on the other 
hand, the government still has numerous other options it can pursue: (1) it can walk 
away and do nothing (in which case the matter will surely be dismissed in due time 
due to the Speedy Trial Act); (2) it can make a Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss any or 
all charges;243 (3) it can negotiate a new DPA and submit it to the court for possible 
approval; (4) it can sign a Non-Prosecution Agreement (“NPA”) with the defendant 
without requiring any judicial approval whatsoever;244 (5) it can file any new, 
additional, or different charges that it deems appropriate; or (6) it can move forward 
with prosecuting the charges initially filed in the matter. Thus, giving a district court 
the power to accept or reject a DPA based on a review of its agreement terms in no 
way interferes with government discretion regarding charging decisions; in no way 
does it interfere with government choices “about whether to initiate charges, whom 
to prosecute, which charges to bring, and whether to dismiss charges once 
brought.”245  
Fokker II correctly states,246 and it is well settled, that the Judiciary lacks 
competence to review the prosecution’s initiation and dismissal of charges.247 
However, the appellate court then concludes that this lack of competence “equally 
applies to review of [1] the prosecution’s decision to pursue a DPA and [2] the 
choices reflected in the agreement’s terms.”248 As for the first of those two—the 
prosecution’s decision to pursue a DPA—a federal court certainly cannot review or 
interfere with a prosecutor’s discretion to file a DPA for approval, which is arguably 
the equivalent of “pursue a DPA.” This is a straightforward separation-of-power 
																																								 																				
242 See Greenblum, supra note 33, at 1864 (“Deferral is a powerful prosecutorial tool 
because it is negotiated and implemented exclusively by the prosecutor.”). 
243 FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a). 
244 Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Judicial Review of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
Feb. 6, 2015, at 3 (“NPAs, unlike DPAs, do not typically involve filings that require court 
approval.”).  
245 Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 737. 
246 Id. at 741, 744. 
247 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985). 
248 Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 744. 
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scenario: the government files the DPA and the motion for exclusion of time under 
the Speedy Trial Act, and then awaits the court’s ruling on the motion.249  
However, the second contention by the appellate court—that the Judiciary 
lacks competence to review the agreement term choices—is simply incorrect for two 
reasons. First because, as was just discussed at length, DPA agreement provisions 
are not the functional equivalent of charging decisions. Second because although it 
takes time for a district court to become familiar with the details of a case in order 
to assess the terms of the DPA, district court judges—including those handling the 
Fokker I, Saena Tech Corp., and HSBC matters—have proven through past rulings 
that they are willing to be more than “potted plants” and “rubber stamps”250 in the 
DPA process, and in fact are willing to spend the time and energy required to 
thoroughly understand the issues involved in even very complex cases.251 Moreover, 
not only has Congress specifically directed district courts to play a role in the DPA 
approval process,252 but district courts have a long history of competently reviewing 
plea agreements253 and consent orders,254 and a review process for DPA agreement 
terms would present similar challenges that can also be competently, and 
successfully, met.255  
Fokker II concludes that the district court denied the exclusion of time (and 
thereby rejected the DPA) based partly on concerns that the government should have 
made different charging decisions.256 As the court puts it: “[w]e hold that the 
[Speedy Trial] Act confers no authority in a court to withhold exclusion of time 
pursuant to a DPA based on concerns that the government should bring different 
																																								 																				
249 The DPA approval process entails filing the DPA agreement along with a motion 
for exclusion of time pursuant to Section 3161(h)(2) of the Speedy Trial Act, thereby 
enabling the government to exceed the Act’s normal seventy-day time limit associated with 
prosecuting a case. See supra Part III. 
250 The HSBC district court noted it was not willing to act as a mere “potted plant” in 
the DPA approval process, HSBC I, No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 1, 2013), and the Fokker district court noted it was not a mere “rubber stamp” in the 
process, Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 164 (D.D.C. 2015).  
251 DPA provisions are wide-ranging in terms of the substantive areas they cover—
including issues surrounding implementing monitors, fines, and enhanced anticorruption 
control systems and compliance measures within the company’s finance office and elsewhere 
throughout the company. First, supra note 41, at 47. 
252 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2008).  
253 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 745–46 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
254 See discussion infra Section V.D.  
255 Of course, there might be reasons why procedures should be put into place to enable 
the government to have in camera conversations with the district court judge, enabling the 
judge to better understand the reasoning behind some of the government’s proposed deal 
provisions. If the judge ultimately rejects the DPA and the government decides to proceed to 
trial, however, it might then be appropriate for a new judge to be assigned to the matter—
one not privy to the sensitive information discussed earlier in camera, such as the strength of 
the government’s case, etc. 
256 Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 738–40. 
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charges or should charge different defendants.”257 However, although the district 
court expressed great surprise that no individuals were being prosecuted in the 
matter,258 it could be argued that the decision to reject was nevertheless based on the 
court’s concerns of leniency toward the company with respect to the fine, 
probationary period, and monitoring plan.259 In fact, in cataloguing near the end of 
the opinion the “minimum” that “one would expect” to see in the DPA, the court 
says nothing about charging decisions.260 Rather, the court stated:  
 
Surely one would expect, at a minimum, a fine that exceeded the amount 
of revenue generated, a probationary period longer than 18 months, and a 
monitor trusted by the Court to verify for it and the Government both that 
this rogue company truly is on the path to complete compliance.261  
 
Of course, to the extent any district court tells the government to file new or 
different charges in a given case, or suggests that DPA approval is contingent upon 
the government doing so, such behavior would cross the line of appropriate judicial 
conduct and would amount to “‘assum[ing] the role of Attorney General.’”262 But 
that is not what occurred in this case. In fact, the court in Fokker I appeared to be 
emphasizing that it was not crossing the line into inappropriate behavior when it 
stated: “[t]o be clear . . . I am not ordering or advising the Government, or the 
defendant, to undertake or refrain from undertaking any particular action—I am 
merely declining to approve the document before me.”263  
It could be argued that a certain amount of damage was done, and could not be 
remedied, when the Fokker I court listed the “minimum” fine, probationary period, 
and monitoring situation that “one would expect” to be included in the DPA 
agreement.264 After all, such comments could be interpreted as the court suggesting 
what must be included in a future version of the same DPA to gain court approval, 
thereby stoking separation of power concerns that prohibit district courts from 
assisting the government in crafting DPAs.265 With that in mind, in the future, if a 
																																								 																				
257 Id. at 738. 
258 Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 166 (D.D.C. 2015). 
259 Id. at 167. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 743 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 
1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
263 Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 167.  
264 Id. 
265 See Mary Miller, Note, More Than Just a Potted Plant: A Court’s Authority to 
Review Deferred Prosecution Agreements Under the Speedy Trial Act and Under Its Inherent 
Supervisory Power, 115 MICH. L. REV. 135, 166 (2016) (“Some might argue that to serve 
justice, courts should be able to review specific terms within the agreements and suggest 
changes and alterations to make the terms acceptable, rather than being constrained to accept 
or reject the agreements in their entirety. Such review, however, may give rise to real 
separation-of-powers concerns.”). 
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district court decides to reject a DPA, it would be a better course of action for the 
court to refrain from making any suggestion whatsoever regarding what should or 
should not be included in the agreement, and instead to state only that (1) the court 
is declining to approve the agreement set before it, and (2) the court remains open 
to considering a modified version in the future should the parties decide to submit 
one.266  
 
D.  Public Interest 
 
The legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act makes clear that public interest 
was at the forefront of concerns driving the passage of the legislation.267 For 
example, the record indicates there would be a “requirement that continuances be 
granted only upon a showing of good cause, taking into account not only the consent 
of the parties but also the public interest in prompt disposition of the case.”268 Judge 
William G. Young reminds us that, in the context of plea agreements, the judge’s 
role “is zealously to protect the public interest.”269 The same is true for DPAs: the 
district court judge, being the only independent safeguard in place to protect the 
parties and the public, needs to be able to review the agreement’s terms and thereby 
determine whether the agreement should be accepted or rejected. Judge Young 
points out that considerations of the public interest are actually “heightened” in the 
criminal law context270—the context in which corporate DPAs commonly occur.  
Moreover, again specifically in the context of plea agreements, Judge Young 
reminds us that when a judge accepts a plea agreement and then moves to sentence 
the defendant, the court thereby “places the imprimatur of legitimacy, as an 
independent branch of government, on the parties’ bargain.”271 Indeed, district 
courts place their “imprimatur of legitimacy” on parties’ negotiated outcomes in 
numerous processes—including the three ADR processes of plea agreements, 
consent orders, and DPAs.272 And although Judge Young sees a difference between 
“a judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea with an attendant sentencing 
																																								 																				
266 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.14 (2004) (“The judge must 
guard against the temptation to become an advocate—either in favor of the settlement 
because of a desire to conclude the litigation, or against the settlement because of the 
responsibility to protect the rights of those not party to it.”). 
267 Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 501 (2006) (noting the Speedy Trial Act “was 
designed with the public interest firmly in mind.”). 
268 PARTRIDGE, supra note 30, at 11–12 (emphasis added). 
269 United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D. Mass. 2013). 
270 Id. at 325. 
271 Id.  
272 See, e.g., Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The parties are, in 
essence, requesting the Court to lend its judicial imprimatur to their DPA.”); United States 
v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 29 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he [Speedy Trial Act] 
requirement of court approval implies that the court must place its formal imprimatur on the 
[DPA] agreement.”); HSBC I, No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 
2013) (“The parties have asked the Court to lend . . . a judicial imprimatur to the DPA . . . .”).  
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recommendation” and “a judge’s decision to issue a consent order, similar 
considerations of public interest obtain.”273 These same considerations of public 
interest apply to DPAs as well. Thus, district courts, if given reasonable powers to 
review agreements achieved through each of the three ADR processes, can play a 
crucial role in protecting the public interest. This is especially so when corporate 
entities are involved, given their unique strength and position to cause public 
harm.274  
Moreover, what Professors Richard Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas tell us 
about plea deals is in many respects applicable to all three ADR processes: 
 
There is only one thing missing from this rosy mutuality of advantage: 
justice. Sentencing should not be about haggling over the market price of 
a sack of potatoes, but about doing justice. In a democracy, justice must 
heed public values and voices . . . . The interests and views at stake are not 
limited to those of two partisans who bring their deal to the sentencing 
judge as a fait accompli. Those partisans may selectively present 
information and pursue private agendas that may diverge from those of 
the public at large. As prosecutors are imperfect agents of the public 
interest, we cannot complacently trust plea bargaining to do justice.275 
 
With respect to all three ADR processes, the government actors are “imperfect 
agents of the public interest” and cannot be trusted “to do justice” in crafting the 
agreements.276 Even a former U.S. Deputy Attorney General suggested that federal 
prosecutors can potentially be “stupid, malevolent, or a cowboy or cowgirl 
who . . . [do] not want to be reasonable” when making prosecution related 
decisions.277 This view adds credence to the notion that district courts should be 
given reasonable and adequate powers of judicial review over the DPAs that are, 
after all, being negotiated by some of those very same federal prosecutors. Such 
																																								 																				
273 Orthofix, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 327 (emphasis added). 
274 See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t 
Components & United States Att’ys 2 (Dec. 12, 2006) (stating that “certain crimes that carry 
with them a substantial risk of great public harm . . . are by their nature most likely to be 
committed by businesses”). 
275 Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2012) (emphasis added). 
276 Id. at 4. 
277 Larry D. Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1251, 1254 
(2010).  
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judicial review would help protect the public interest, just as it does in the case of 
plea agreements278 and consent agreements.279 
Moreover, procedurally, the appeal in the Fokker I matter was somewhat 
unusual, with the Department of Justice and the Fokker company together on one 
side (both supporting approval of the DPA), versus the district court on the other 
side (obviously opposing DPA approval). It is unclear whether either the district 
court or the amicus curiae appointed by the appellate court (who advocated on behalf 
of the district court before the appellate tribunal)280 had any legal or procedural rights 
to appeal the tribunal’s ruling. If such an option was not available (or if it was 
available but was not pursued for whatever reason), does that suggest the public 
interest concerns in Fokker I have not yet been exhaustively addressed? After all, if 
the DOJ and the Fokker company had failed to prevail at the appellate court level, it 
seems likely they would have pursued the next available step for review—meaning 
they probably would have first requested a rehearing en banc, and if that avenue did 
not yield positive results they might have filed a petition for writ of certiorari with 
the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court. Does the fact that the district court and/or 
amicus did not (or for whatever reason could not) take such steps suggest a 
deficiency within the criminal justice system—especially with respect to adequately 
protecting the interests of the public when DPAs are used in corporate matters? 
Although this issue falls outside the scope of this Article, it is worthy of further 
investigation and consideration. 
 
E.  Standard of Review 
 
It is interesting to note that the specific reasons listed by the Fokker I court for 
denying the DPA might justify rejecting that DPA even under the very narrow 
standard of review that was created by Fokker II. The appellate court created the 
following standard: the district court is to determine whether the DPA is “geared to 
enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the law, and is not instead a 
pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial Act’s time constraints”281 and 
																																								 																				
278 Orthofix, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 321; see also United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 
1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (“While ‘[t]he procedures of Rule 11 are largely for the protection of 
criminal defendants . . . Rule 11 also contemplates the rejection of a negotiated plea when 
the district court believes that bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.’” 
(quoting United States v. Miller, 772 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983))). 
279 See S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Unless a consent decree 
is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved.”) (citations omitted); S.E.C. 
v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1181 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[W]hen the district judge is presented with 
a proposed consent judgment, he is not merely a ‘rubber stamp.’”). 
280 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 740 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Because both parties seek to overturn 
the district court’s denial of their joint motion to exclude time, we appointed an amicus curiae 
to present arguments defending the district court’s action.”). 
281 Id. at 744. 
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therefore the district court will “confine[] its inquiry to examining whether the DPA 
served the purpose of allowing [the defendant] to demonstrate its good conduct.”282 
Applying that standard to the Fokker I case, a district court would very likely 
conclude that the second part of the test (i.e., the proposed DPA did not appear to be 
a pretext for evading the Speedy Trial Act’s time constraints) is clearly met; nothing 
emerged in the record of the case to suggest a contrary conclusion.283 However, a 
district court could easily determine that the first part of the test (i.e., that the 
agreement was geared to enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the 
law) is not met because (1) the probationary period could be considered too short to 
accurately determine if the company is successfully on a path to real and long-term 
change and compliance, and (2) a monitor has not been put into place to verify to 
the government and to the court that the company is in fact achieving full compliance 
with all conditions of the DPA.284 
Moreover, one might consider how easy it will be, in future cases, for a DPA 
agreement to meet the narrow standard of review that has been set forth by Fokker 
II. A plain reading of the standard suggests that a DPA filed with a district court 
would have to do nothing more than accomplish the following three goals: (1) 
institute “best practices” types of measures within the company to bring about 
compliance with the law; (2) provide a significant probationary period (say, three 
years) to allow enough time to assess whether the instituted changes are working; 
and (3) employ a monitor to verify that progress is in fact being made. In applying 
this standard to the original Fokker I DPA, if the agreement had included provisions 
to accomplish those three specific goals and nothing more—not even a fine or an 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing—the DPA would have successfully met the 
standard, and the district court would have been obligated, at least within the D.C. 
Circuit, to approve the DPA. Simply put, the standard of review created by Fokker 
II fails to sufficiently restrain government discretion in using corporate DPAs, 
resulting in the potentiality for future agreements to be unreasonable, unjust, or not 
within the rule of law.285  
In U.S. v. Brett Townsend,286 a money laundering case, after a request was made 
that the court approve the DPA pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), the court 
concluded: “[a]fter an investigation of the offense and the defendant’s current health 
condition, it appears that the interests of the United States, Mr. Townsend’s interests, 
and the interests of justice will be served by the [DPA].”287 Thus, in trying to 
determine what factors should form a standard of review in the approval process, the 
court places on the balance the court’s assessment of the interests of the United 
States, the defendant, and justice itself.288  
																																								 																				
282 Id. at 747. 
283 Id. 
284 Fokker I, 79 F. Supp. 3d. 160, 167 (D.D.C 2015). 
285 Arlen, supra note 26, at 192–93. 
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This standard resembles the one advocated by Professor David Zaring in his 
article, “Rule by Reasonableness.”289 Writing in the context of administrative law, 
Zaring’s following thoughts are equally applicable to the task of formulating a 
standard of review for DPA approval: 
 
standards of review should be performing some duty to the public. They 
should be clarifying what agencies can do and what courts can do. It is not 
clear that this duty to the public is being met, as Chevron turns into an 
increasingly confusing part of an increasingly elaborate and confusing 
series of standards of review.290  
 
Might such a standard—one that balances the interests of the public, the 
defendant, and respect for law more generally—work well when district courts 
review DPAs? Rather than attempt to create a standard that is complex and limited 
to “the province of obscure doctrinal geniuses[,]”291 perhaps it would be more 
productive and fair to the public, to the parties, and to the courts to set forth a 
standard “that . . . really amounts to a fact-specific and context-sensitive 
reasonableness inquiry.”292 A similar standard—one based on reasonableness and 
the weighing of potential harms to the various parties impacted by the ruling—
appears to be employed by the court when deciding whether or not to approve a DPA 
in U.S. v. WakeMed,293 where the court “consider[s] the equities at issue,”294 
including (1) “the impact of defendant’s actions on the primary victims in this 
matter[,]” including taxpayers and the Medicare program;295 (2) “the protection of 
defendant’s employees and healthcare providers who are blameless but who would 
suffer severe consequences” if WakeMed were convicted;296 and (3) “the threat that 
the provision of essential healthcare to WakeMed’s patients would be interrupted” 
if WakeMed were forced to close.297 Thus, “after weighing the seriousness of 
defendant’s offense against the potential harm to innocent parties” if the prosecution 
were to move forward, the court decided to approve the DPA.298 
In a similar vein, it is instructive to consider the standard of review that has 
historically been used in other kinds of cases where district courts must approve 
settlements—including those in the areas of class actions, shareholder derivative 
																																								 																				
289 David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 525–26 (2011). 
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suits, and compromises of claims in bankruptcy court.299 For these three situations, 
district courts historically had to find the settlement to be “fair, adequate, and 
reasonable”300 or had to find that the settlement terms were “not unlawful, 
unreasonable, or inequitable.”301 Again, the thread running through all these 
standards is reasonableness—that a district court must attempt to consider and 
balance the reasonable interests of all parties, including the government, the 
defendant, and the general public.  
Even more technical statutes addressing environmental and labor issues can 
involve approval standards that are grounded in reasonableness. For environmental 
clean-up consent decrees under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), courts must ensure the settlement is 
“reasonable, fair, and consistent with the purposes that CERCLA is intended to 
serve.”302 For claim settlements under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 
courts must ensure the settlement is a “fair and reasonable res[o]lution of a bona fide 
dispute over FLSA provisions.”303 As courts continue to grapple with the important 
task of setting forth a standard of review for corporate DPAs, they would do well to 
turn to these ideas of balancing the reasonable interests of all parties involved.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Currently, federal prosecutors have too much unfettered power and discretion 
in employing DPAs in the context of alleged corporate misconduct. As Professor 
John Coffee warns regarding prosecutors and DPAs: “the deeper problem lies in the 
danger that power corrupts and that prosecutors are starting to possess something 
close to absolute power.”304 Now the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a much 
anticipated case of first impression, decided in Fokker II that judicial review of 
corporate DPAs should be extremely narrow and limited. This Article argues that 
the appellate court decision subordinates public interest, undermines fundamental 
separation-of-power principles, and runs contrary to the dictates of both statutory 
language and legislative history surrounding DPAs. 
The Article demonstrates that despite the holdings of the court in Fokker II, a 
district court, when considering whether or not to approve a DPA agreement, is not 
compelled to “confine[] its inquiry to examining whether the DPA served the 
																																								 																				
299 See United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing 
the standard for approval in proposed class action settlements, proposed shareholder 
derivative suit settlements, and proposed compromises of claims in bankruptcy court). 
300 Id. (citations omitted). 
301 Id. (citation omitted). 
302 United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 253, at 19 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3042). 
303 Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States ex rel. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 679 F.2d 1350, 
1355 (11th Cir. 1982). 
304 John C. Coffee Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has it Gone Too Far?, 27 NAT’L. L. J., 
July 25, 2005, at 13.  
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purpose of allowing [the defendant] to demonstrate its good conduct”305 and is 
permitted to consider “the choices reflected in the agreement’s terms.”306 Although 
district courts should never play a role in crafting DPAs, there are no separation of 
power concerns with those courts reviewing (under a reasonably comprehensive 
standard of review) DPA agreements to ensure adequate protection of the 
government’s interests, the defendant’s interests, the public’s interests, and overall 
respect for the law.307 The Article also suggests that courts outside the D.C. Circuit, 
if faced with the same legal issues, can and should arrive at different conclusions—
ones that empower district courts to conduct, during the DPA approval process, a 
more thorough and comprehensive review of the agreements.  
It is instructive to consider the following parallel situation that unfolded 
approximately forty-five years ago: In 1973, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
in U.S. v. Ammidown308 that a district court must accept a plea agreement unless the 
deal is “such a departure from sound prosecutorial principle as to mark it an abuse 
of prosecutorial discretion.”309 Commenting on that ruling, and going in a different 
direction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: 
 
Although a prosecutor may have wide discretion in initiating prosecutions, 
once the aid of the court has been invoked the court cannot be expected to 
accept without question the prosecutor’s view of the public good. To our 
knowledge no other circuit has followed the District of Columbia in so 
drastically limiting the discretion of a judge in regard to plea bargains.310  
 
Ideally, history will repeat itself with respect to the D.C. Circuit’s narrow and 
limiting ruling in Fokker II, and other courts will choose to move in another 
direction. The U.S. Congress, too, can play a role in redirecting the legal course on 
which corporate DPAs have now been set. Congress has done this in the past when 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an overly-narrow interpretation of a federal 
statute,311 and it should see fit to take similar corrective action in this matter.  
																																								 																				
305 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
306 Id. at 744. 
307 Under Section 9-28.1100 of the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations, addressing “Collateral Consequences,” the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual states that 
“[t]he appropriateness of a criminal charge against a corporation, or some lesser alternative, 
must be evaluated in a pragmatic and reasoned way that produces a fair outcome, taking into 
consideration, among other things, the Department’s need to promote and ensure respect for 
the law.” Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-28.1100 (1997), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-
organizations#9-28.1100 [https://perma.cc/Q8ZD-LB5W]. 
308 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
309 Id. at 622. 
310 UNITED STATES V. BEAN, 564 F.2D 700, 703 N.4 (5TH CIR. 1977). 
311 In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals interpreted provisions within the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act 
(commonly called the “Tunney Act”) that directed district courts to ensure that entry of 
consent decrees in civil antitrust cases filed by the DOJ would be in the public interest. When 
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A central holding in Fokker II is that DPA agreement provisions are in core 
respects functionally equivalent to charging decisions,312 and are therefore insulated 
from judicial review due to “long-settled understandings about the independence of 
the Executive with regard to charging decisions.”313 This Article demonstrates, 
however, that DPA provisions are in fact separate and distinct from charging 
decisions, and they should be subject to judicial control through reasonable review. 
In 1974, when pretrial diversion programs were first being introduced, a note was 
published in the Yale Law Journal that speaks eloquently to this issue. In a section 
entitled “Control of Discretion,” the note states, “[o]nce a prosecutor consents to the 
establishment of a pretrial diversion program, fairness and social policy would 
dictate that his discretion to divert, unlike his discretion to prosecute prior to the 
establishment of the program, should be subject to judicial control.”314 The note 
goes on to state that pretrial diversion “is a sentencing activity by nonjudicial 
personnel” where “the accused is sentenced to a term of probation before trial.”315 
Thus, the note concludes, 
 
[p]retrial diversion encroaches on judicial sentencing authority. Although 
there is no formal adjudication of guilt before sentence, most programs 
tend to proceed as if the accused is guilty in fact and in need of 
rehabilitation. Favorable termination, therefore, preempts the duty of the 
judge to adjudicate and sentence. It should be incumbent upon judges to 
claim responsibility for the diversion decision or, at least, to oversee the 
discretionary decisions of prosecutor and program staff.316 
 
Thus, although Fokker II suggests that the Judiciary’s act of reviewing DPA 
agreement provisions during the approval process can encroach on Executive 
authority,317 the Yale Law Journal piece suggests the exact opposite: that it is the 
prosecutor (or Executive) who, by functionally engaging in adjudication and 
																																								 																				
the government’s motion to grant a decree was denied by the district court, the appellate 
court reversed and said that district courts should accept a decree unless “on its face and even 
after government explanation, [the decree] appears to make a mockery of judicial power.” 
Id. at 1462. Congress later made amendments to the Tunney Act, with statements in the 
Congressional record suggesting the appellate court’s “mockery of judicial power” language 
formed a review standard that was too narrow. 150 CONG. REC. S3615–18 (Apr. 2, 2004). 
One Senator stated the amendments would “insure that the courts can undertake meaningful 
and measured scrutiny of antitrust settlements.” Id. at S3617. 
312 Fokker II, 818 F.3d 733, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“As with conventional charging 
decisions, a DPA’s provisions manifest the Executive’s consideration of factors such as the 
strength of the government’s evidence, the deterrence value of a prosecution, and the 
enforcement priorities of an agency, subjects that are ill-suited to substantial judicial 
oversight.”). 
313 Id. at 738. 
314 Note, supra note 222, at 843 (emphasis added).  
315 Id. (emphasis added). 
316 Id. at 843–44. 
317 Fokker II, 818 F.3d at 743–44. 
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sentencing activities through pretrial diversion, is “preempt[ing] the duty of the 
judge” and thereby encroaching on the authority of the district court (or Judiciary).318 
Correspondingly, Fokker II, rather than deciding to permit the district court “to 
oversee the discretionary decisions of [the] prosecutor” via reasonable review 
powers during the DPA approval process,319 instead decided to severely limit those 
review powers, thereby preventing a much needed balancing of power. Moreover, 
adjudication and sentencing might be just the beginning of activities prosecutors 
engage in (and encroach upon) when using DPAs: most corporate DPAs are made 
up of the functional equivalents of a guilty plea, conviction, sentence, and 
probation—all in one single agreement.320 And the prosecutor controls every facet 
of that agreement and its implementation, including exclusive power in determining 
if the agreement has been breached by the defendant.321  
It is now time for the courts, and Congress, to take corrective action. Two 
federal court judges have already called for Congress to take action with respect to 
DPAs—one did so prior to the Fokker II ruling322 and one did so afterward.323 
Notwithstanding the Fokker II decision, it is important that future courts be 
provided, either through legislation324 or through evolving case law, with meaningful 
review powers over corporate DPAs, including the ability to reject agreements that 
are too harsh, too lenient, or that fail to conform to the rule of law.325 
																																								 																				
318 Note, supra note 222, at 843–44. 
319 Id. 
320 See Breuer, supra note 9 (“[I]n many ways, a DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, 
and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea.”); Rush et al., supra note 5, at 1–3 (suggesting that 
DPA agreements basically amount to a guilty plea, a conviction, and a probationary period 
for the defendant); Hearing, supra note 219, at 5 (suggesting that DPAs give prosecutors 
“unmitigated power to be judge, jury and sentencer” (emphasis added)). 
321 See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through 
the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) (“Although negotiated 
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322 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 30 n.9 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(“[C]ongressional action to clarify the standards a court should apply when confronted with 
a corporate deferred-prosecution agreement may be appropriate.”). 
323 Judge Rosemary Pooler wrote, “I respectfully suggest it is time for Congress to 
consider implementing legislation providing for [meaningful court oversight of DPAs].” 
United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC II), 863 F.3d 125, 143 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(Pooler, J., concurring).  
324 Starting in 2009, Congress has proposed, multiple times, legislation that would 
ensure judicial review of the approval, implementation, and termination processes for DPAs, 
however, the bill—entitled The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act (“ADPA”)—has 
never been enacted into law. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
325 Arlen, supra note 26, at 192–93. 
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Of these two possibilities to remedy the current situation—correction through 
developing case law from the courts, or correction through legislative reform from 
Congress—it is more likely to be Congress that will act to make the necessary 
changes. As for development of case law, core holdings of Fokker II have already 
been adopted by another federal circuit. In U.S. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,326 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit focused on matters concerning DPA 
implementation (as opposed to approval) processes.327 In its opinion, the court made 
clear that it fully agreed with the court’s ruling and reasoning in Fokker II regarding 
DPA approval.328 Indeed, the court stated that district courts should be limited to the 
following specific and highly circumscribed role during the approval and 
implementation of corporate DPAs: “Absent unusual circumstances not present 
here, a district court’s role vis-à-vis a DPA is limited to arraigning the defendant, 
granting a speedy trial waiver if the DPA does not represent an improper attempt to 
circumvent the speedy trial clock, and adjudicating motions or disputes as they 
arise.”329 
Moreover, given that the Fokker appellate decision was a matter of first 
impression, that court’s interpretation of the relevant statute—18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(2)—will likely continue to have substantial influence on future courts and 
opinions, just as it did on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and its 
recent HSBC decision. As one scholar explains, “when it comes to reexamining 
judicial interpretations of statutes, courts tend to be extremely deferential to 
established prior constructions. In fact, the general rule is that judicial interpretations 
of statutes, once rendered, enjoy heightened stare decisis effect, sometimes referred 
to as a ‘super-strong’ presumption of correctness.”330 
Under the Fokker appellate court ruling, corporate DPAs are permitted to 
engender a troubling usurpation by the Executive of wide-ranging power that needs 
to be checked and balanced by the Judiciary.331 As Judge Rosemary S. Pooler notes 
in her concurring opinion of the recent HSBC appellate court decision: “[a]s the law 
governing DPAs stands now, . . . the prosecution exercises the core judicial functions 
of adjudicating guilt and imposing sentence with no meaningful oversight from the 
courts.”332 And as Professor Richard Epstein cautions, DPA agreements can “turn[] 
the prosecutor into judge and jury, thus undermining our principles of separation of 
																																								 																				




330 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1823, 1828 (2015). 
331 But see HSBC II, in which the appellate court states that it agrees with the Fokker 
appellate court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(2) and that “such an interpretation 
accords with the ordinary distribution of power between the judiciary and the Executive in 
the realm of criminal prosecution.” HSBC II, 863 F.3d at 138 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
332 Id. at 143 (Pooler, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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powers.”333 Despite the development of corporate DPA law and policy in its current, 
ill-advised direction, I am nonetheless hopeful that other courts, or Congress, will 
soon redirect that course of development, resulting in an all-important rebalancing 
of power between the Executive and Judiciary as it pertains to corporate DPAs. 
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